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                                               Abstract  
This paper critically reviews the current various measures of trust 
through surveys/questionnaires and trust experiments. The main 
shortcoming from such approaches is that the trust index produced 
from surveys and experiment are ambiguous. Given these 
arguments, I use Factor Analysis technique to construct a new trust 
index that account for indicators of degree of trust. Consequently, 
the rankings of countries in my index is more consistent compared 
to the rankings of existing trust indices. Using the above, I illustrate 
the panel analysis on the influence of trust on FDI inflows and 
income inequality. Trust turns out to play a significant role on FDI 
inflows. With regard to income inequality, trust is more 
pronounced among the OECD countries.    
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1   Introduction  
In general, trust can be defined as a person’s belief in the integrity, reliability, and 
ability of others."Others" refers to either different (groups of) people or, more 
broadly, the various institutional aspects of the society in which a person lives 
(e.g., leaders and the quality of governance; law and order, etc.). 
With respect to economics, trust can be seen as facilitating various aspects of 
economic activity. In particular, researchers have argued that trust can reduce 
transaction costs, promote cooperation, and encourage business activities (Knack 
and Keefer 1997). Therefore, economists claim that a higher level of social trust is 
positively correlated with economic development (Moegan and Hunt 1994). Put 
differently, it has been widely accepted and demonstrated that social trust 
benefits the economy and that a low level of trust inhibits economic growth. 
Historically, sociologists and economists have examined various forms of trust, 
each one associated with specific behavioural characteristics. Broadly speaking, 
some of the various forms of trust include generalised trust, particularised trust, 
strategic trust and moralistic trust (Uslaner 2003). Generalised trust facilitates 
interactions with people who are different from ourselves and is thus strikingly 
different from particularised trust in which people only have faith in cooperating 
with individuals or groups possessing similar characteristics, such as ethnicity 
religion, or social class. Whereas generalised trust is founded solidly upon the 
belief that individuals/groups from different backgrounds can indeed pursue 
common and mutually advantageous goals, particularised trust often occurs 
within a clan as each group attends to their own interests and rarely places any 
faith in the good intentions of others. For example, Evangelical Christians in the 
United States have very high in-group trust since they volunteer and donate to 
charities within their own faith communities. Nevertheless, it has been suggested 
that they rarely display a similar degree of trust towards other groups (Wuthnow 
1999; Uslaner 2001). Moralistic trust refers to circumstances in which people place 
their faith in those who they believe share their common moral code. Strategic 
trust describes situations in which different parties understand (either through 
information or their own experience) that cooperation can lead to mutually 
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advantageous outcomes (Uslaner 2003). 
The earliest related literature analyses social capital, including trust, and the 
impacts of social capital on government performance across regions in Italy 
(Banfield 1958; Coleman 1988; Gambetta 1988; Putnam et al. 1993). Since those 
studies, the importance of trust to economic performance has drawn substantial 
attention. Therefore, the impact of trust on economic outcomes has been 
empirically investigated across different countries by Knack and Keefer (1997) 
and La Porta et al. (1997). The evidence also suggests that trust can promote 
financial development, effectively facilitate economic outcomes such as 
entrepreneurship and influence economic exchanges between two countries 
(Guiso et al. 2004, 2006, and 2009). Moreover, Bloom et al. (2007), Algan and Cahuc 
(2009) and Aghion et al. (2010) examine the correlation between trust and 
institutions.   
Furthermore, the theoretical foundations of the effect of trust on the economy 
have been provided by Zak and Knack (2001). They present a model in which the 
rate of investment is determined by the level of trust. In their model, trust is 
characterised as the time that agents allocate to production rather than verifying 
others’ trustworthiness. Thus, this model effectively illustrates how different 
levels of trust determine economic performance. It also demonstrates the 
existence of a low-trust poverty trap. According to the model, trust depends on 
the institutional, economic and social environment. Specifically, trust is 
positively correlated with the institutional environment and economic conditions 
but negatively correlated with population heterogeneity.  
The problem in this area is determining how trust should be measured. 
Existing research papers tend to employ measures of trust that are produced 
through surveys/questionnaires. Since the 1980s, surveys covering a large 
number of countries such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the World 
Value Survey (WVS) have become available. The “standard” survey questions 
addressing trust are as follows: “Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” from the GSS 
or “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” from the WVS. Measurements 
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of trust are conducted by assessing the average responses as “try to be fair” and 
“can be trusted” to the corresponding survey questions. The survey results are 
either used as the alternative measurement of trust or as the indicators of moral 
values (Tabellini 2010; Guiso et al., 2011).  
However, the surveys can be interpreted differently due to the polysemy of the 
questions and responses (Algan and Cahuc 2013). Moreover, the respondents 
who claim to have high trust in others may behave differently in the reality 
(Algan and Cahuc 2013). In addition, there is always the risk that survey data 
contain systematic measurement errors, which can be either self-reported errors 
that are constant for each respondent over time or answers from a small group of 
people with particular personality traits that may not be informative about their 
corresponding behaviour (Zak 2005). Finally, the lack of WVS data on trust for 
less developed countries hinders the investigation into trust in these countries 
and often makes inter-temporal comparisons and cross-country studies 
infeasible.  
To improve the measurement of trust, some researchers have conducted 
laboratory experiments that usually apply the “trust game” raised by Berg et al. 
(1995) or its variants.  
Earlier studies demonstrate that the correlation between the answers to the 
trust survey and the behaviours in the experiment are mixed. For example, 
Glaeser et al. (2000) reveal that the answers to the trust survey are inconsistent 
with the behaviour in experiments. However, Holm and Danielson (2005) 
suggest that the answers to the trust survey and the behaviour in experiments 
are positively correlated in some countries, such as Sweden. Fehr et al. (2002) 
compare the results from the representative survey and representative 
behavioural data from a social dilemma experiment in Germany to illustrate that 
the trust question can measure the behaviour of trust but not trustworthiness. 
Meanwhile, Ermisch et al. (2009) show that the trust survey cannot predict 
behaviour in the trust experiment by conducting a real monetary rewards 
experiment on a sample of the British population.  
    Perez et al. (2006) suggest exploring the trust proxy in two directions: either by 
obtaining the data from one of the surveys or by proxying the variables that 
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indicate the degree of trust, particularly in reference to a financial or commercial 
relationship. Since the self-reported trust levels from the surveys and the actual 
behaviour in trust experiments are ambiguous, this paper follows the second 
approach to construct a new trust index by considering social and institutional 
characteristics as well as the educational and socioeconomic conditions that have 
been shown to affect trust levels.  
    This analysis is a systematic attempt to construct an alternative measure of 
trust. It also contributes to the literature by using a panel study to illustrate the 
effect of trust on economic performance variables. The three main objectives are 
to construct a new trust index by applying a factor analysis (FA) technique, to 
compare the new trust index to the previous measures of trust (trust survey), and 
to investigate the correlation between trust and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows as well as income inequality.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
components of the trust index, the FA technique, and how FA can be used to 
construct the trust index. Section 3 compares the trust index to the trust survey 
measurement. Section 4 describes the application of the trust index by examining 
the correlation between the trust index and economic performance variables, 
such as FDI inflows and income inequality. Section 5 concludes this paper by 
discussing its main findings and limitations.  
 
2   Trust index 
This section explains the process of generating the trust index. The first 
subsection illustrates the components used to build the trust index. The 
theoretical foundations and empirical evidence for each component are 
discussed. In the second subsection, an FA technique is introduced and applied 
to assign weightings to all the components. Lastly, the third subsection presents 
the trust index built by the FA technique for 136 countries and reveals its validity.  
 
2.1   Components of the trust index  
Many authors emphasise the determining role of social or political institutions 
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and social relationships on trust (Arrow 1972; Putnam et al. 1993; Knack 2002; 
Uslaner 2002). Additionally, Glaeser et al. (2002) propose an economic approach 
to trust and demonstrate the correlation between trust and economic growth. I 
consider both economic and non-economic indicators in terms of degree of trust 
to generate a proxy. Therefore, my trust index would include three aspects: 
institutional environment; population heterogeneity; and educational and 
socioeconomic conditions, which are also consistent with the theoretical work of 
Zak and Knack (2001). 
Most of the components I use to generate the trust index are drawn from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. The ICRG generates data 
concerning the ratings of political, economic and financial risks by using 
approximately 30 metrics based on original indicators. As a result, the generated 
data have different score points describing the scenarios for each country in each 
year. Here, I mainly employ the political rating data.  
 
2.1.1   Institutional environment 
For the institutional environment, I employ the index of property rights introduced 
by Knack and Keefer (1995). The index of property rights is produced by equally 
weighing four indicators from the ICRG: quality of bureaucracy, law and order, 
corruption and investment profile. Quality of bureaucracy mainly captures the degree 
of strength of institutions and the quality of their bureaucracy using scores that 
range from 0 to 4. For the countries with higher scores, government change 
would not cause a dramatic policy revision or interruption in government service. 
However, if a country lacks a cushioning effect when facing a change in the 
government, that country would receive lower ratings. Law and order assesses two 
parts: the “law” element and the “order” element. The “law” part reflects the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the “order” part reviews the 
willingness of citizens to implement and comply with laws. Law and order scores 
range from 0 to 6. If a country suffers from a very high crime rate or a country’s 
laws are always ignored without effective sanction, it would be given a low 
rating. Higher scores are allocated to countries with a greater respect for their 
judicial system. Corruption measures the corruption rating of a country’s political 
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system. Specifically, corruption is assessed in terms of “excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, ‘favour-for-favours’, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business”. Higher ratings are given 
to countries in which special payments make no difference to the government 
officials, while the lower ratings are given to the countries with serious 
corruption problems. Investment profile examines the possible risks to investments 
that are not caused by other political, economic or financial risk components. This 
indicator mainly consists of “contract viability/expropriation”, “profits 
repatriation” and “payment delays”. Investment profile is scored from 0 to 12 with 
higher scores implying a lower risk to investment. The scores of the index of 
property rights range from 0 to 28. Higher scores indicate a country’s 
governmental institutions are more effective, guaranteeing property rights and 
contract enforcement.   
Knack and Keefer (1997) suggest that trust can be created by formal institutions 
such as a strong rule of law. Essentially, citizens tend to rely on informal and 
local rules in a weak legal enforcement environment, which nourishes 
particularised trust within a close social circle while simultaneously weakening 
generalised trust. The Mafia in Sicily vividly demonstrates the evolution of 
particularised trust under weak legal enforcement. Gambetta (1993) states that 
legal enforcement was very weak in Sicily around 1812 since the abolition of 
feudalism took place much later there than in the rest of Europe. As the state was 
unable to protect private property rights there, the Mafia took advantage by 
providing informal local protection. This local protection through patronage 
clearly treats those under the protection differently from everyone else. Without 
legal institutions and civic-minded officials, generalised trust can be damaged 
(Rothstein 2011). In the same vein, Guiso et al. (2008) note that weak legal 
enforcement in the distant past in some regions of Italy is still associated with a 
lower level of trust today.  
The empirical work of Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) also shows the positive 
correlation between trust and the institutional environment. This correlation is 
robust when using different measurements of institution quality which one 
commonly applied in the literature, such as government effectiveness, 
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accountability and corruption, as well as the effectiveness of property rights 
protection, rule of law and contract enforcement.  
Moreover, Tabellini (2008) uses a novel way to verify the casual effect of 
institutional quality on trust. Specifically, he documents the correlation between 
the trust level of US immigrants and the institutional environment of their 
country of origin. 
Recently, Algan and Cahuc (2013) illustrate the strong correlation between 
trust and institutional system by empirically investigating a sample of 100 
countries. They also find a similar positive correlation between trust and 
governance quality in 163 European regions. 
 
2.1.2   Population heterogeneity 
In terms of population heterogeneity, I use measures of ethnic tensions, religious 
tensions and internal conflict from the ICRG. The scores of both ethnic tensions and 
religious tensions range from 0 to 6 with a low rating reflecting high tensions. 
Ethnic tensions may stem from a diverse racial, national or linguistic composition 
within a country. Higher scores are allocated to the countries with minimal 
tensions even if these types of differences exist among the people, while lower 
scores are allocated to countries with one intolerant group that is unwilling to 
compromise with the opposing group. In such countries, racial and national 
tensions are very high, preventing reconciliation. These tensions may even result 
in a civil war. Religious tensions might be caused by a single religious group’s 
desire to express its own identity, dominate governance or even separate from 
the country. Countries with a single religious group that desires to dominate the 
government or even suppress religious freedom would eventually have a 
substantial social distance between that group and citizens with different 
religions. Internal conflict assesses the “political violence” in the country, which 
involves three subcomponents: “civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political 
violence and civil disorder”. Countries with higher ratings would have no armed 
or civil unrest against the government. These countries would also have 
governments that prevent “arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own 
people”. Otherwise, the country would receive lower scores.  
 9 
 
Ritzen and Woolcock (2000), Woolcock et al. (2006) and Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) 
emphasise that the essential element of trust is social cohesion. Social cohesion is 
defined by Ritzen and Woolcock (2000) as “a state of affairs in which a group of 
people have an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change”. 
This definition suggests that ethnic tensions can be a proxy for social cohesion 
because social cohesion not only reflects the popular observance of policy 
reforms but also affects the institutional implementation of those reforms. 
Additionally, ethnic fractionalisation might lead to the social exclusion of specific 
ethnic groups or even evoke a civil war (Woolcock et al. 2006; Baliamoune-Lutz 
2009). In the same vein, Putnam (2007) reveals that trust tends to decline where 
ethnic fractionalisation or segregation exist. He illustrates that trust is relatively 
low in ethnically diverse residential areas based on cross-cities studies. By 
investigating across US states, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) provide 
similar evidence. The findings may be because people naturally prefer to trust 
others with similar backgrounds and are therefore inclined to place less trust in 
those who are different from them. Moreover, high ethnic tensions result in lower 
cooperation, as represented by collective actions such as funding and public 
goods (Alesina et al. 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). This decline in cooperation 
might be primarily due to weakened collective action resulting from distinct 
preferences and the free rider problem within ethnically diverse areas.  
The influence of religious tensions on trust is similar to the influence of ethnic 
tensions. Levi (1996) and Uslaner (2002) reveal that some groups may inhibit 
instead of improving generalised trust in people who are outside the group. 
Groups that reinforce the in-group identity, such as religious fundamentalists 
and racists, can undermine generalised trust. Stolle (2000) suggests that if the 
group members have strong within-group trust, then those group members tend 
to have less trust in outsiders over time.  
Jacob and Tyrell (2010) note that the inhabitants of regions undergoing civil 
war tend to have a relatively low probability of fulfilling their civic duties, 
resulting in problems such as low voter turnout, low rate of participation in 
voluntary associations and low rate of voluntary organ donation. Moreover, 
Rohner et al. (2013) propose a theory regarding how war and civic conflicts are 
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associated with distrust. They claim that a history of conflicts impacts the trust 
(beliefs) of the agent. The agent then redefines their trust (beliefs) and passes it 
to the next generation. Therefore, conflicts such as civil wars and civil disorder 
could even result in the permanent collapse of trust. Additionally, the empirical 
research of Rohner et al. (2013) illustrates that the measure of average trust is 
negatively associated with the frequency of civil war after controlling for 
democracy and other covariates based on country-level statistics during the 
period 1981-2008. Similarly, by exploring the violence surrounding the 2007 
Kenyan election in Africa, Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero (2010) indicate that 
violence undermines generalised trust. In the same pattern, Rohner et al. (2013) 
uncover the causal effects of internal conflicts on trust by using individual- and 
country-level data in Uganda during the period 2002-2004. These scholars 
provide the robust results of intense fighting, which damages generalised trust 
by using a variety of identification methods.  
 
2.1.3   Education and socioeconomic conditions 
I adopt socioeconomic conditions from the ICRG and secondary school enrolment from 
the World Bank as proxies. Socioeconomic conditions measures factors including 
“unemployment rate, consumer confidence and poverty”, which reflect the 
socioeconomic pressures at work and in society. The points range from 0 to 12. 
High ratings are given to countries in which the citizens live under good 
socioeconomic conditions. Secondary school enrolment (% of gross) measures the 
percent of students enrolled at the secondary school level regardless of age. 
Hausman (1979) and Womeldorff (1991) note that education is positively 
related to trust because an individual who disutility the future is more likely to 
violate promises when they trade with others and presumably assume that 
promises made to them would also be violated. Indeed, Helliwell and Putnam 
(2007) argue that education can facilitate social trust. If individuals believe that 
people with higher education levels are trustworthy, then those individuals tend 
to trust others with higher education levels and might return to their trusting 
behaviour. Therefore, a higher average education level could promote a climate 
of trust. Presumably, people are more likely to trust others in the society with 
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higher average education level.   
Earlier studies have revealed that individuals in high socioeconomic 
conditions tend to have higher levels of generalised trust than those in low 
socioeconomic conditions (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 2000; Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2002; Subramanian et al. 2003; Kaasa and Parts 2008). Furthermore, 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) note that poverty, which is also captured by 
socioeconomic condition, could damage the social fabric since the poor would 
feel isolated and disrespected by others.  
To construct an index of country-level trust, set of weights must be selected for 
each component. Rather than imposing arbitrary or equal weights, I apply an FA 
technique to let the data determine the weights directly. The statistical summary 
of each component can be seen in Appendix 1. 
 
2.2   Factor analysis technique 
 
2.2.1   Factor analysis 
FA is a statistical methodology that aims to use a smaller number of latent 
variables to represent a larger number of observed variables (Lewis-Beck 1994). 
For example, after using FA, the variation within five observed variables can be 
represented by one or two unobserved variables (latent factors). FA can also be 
used to predict latent variables by investigating the joint variation within the 
observed variables. Using this technique, each observed variable can be modelled 
as a linear combination of the latent factors with the term “error”. Since the 
observed variables are interrelated, the set of variables can finally be reduced to 
a lower number of unobserved factors. FA was first used in psychometrics field, 
and it was later widely used in the social sciences, marketing and other applied 
economics research areas.   
    FA is similar to principal component analysis (PCA). However, these two 
techniques are not exactly identical. PCA is a data description technique, while 
FA can be used to verify hypotheses concerning the correlation between the 
original data. Moreover, according to the concepts of PCA and FA, although both 
will eventually maximise the total variance, they capture different types of 
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variance. Specifically, the components in PCA have orthogonal linear 
combinations, and they maximise the total variance. However, the factors in FA 
are linearly combined to maximise the shared fraction of the variance, namely, 
the latent construction. Thus, FA is suitable for testing a theoretical model of 
latent factors related to observed variables. With respect to simply reducing the 
number of current variables, PCA is more appropriate.  
 
2.2.2   Statistical model 
Suppose that in a dataset, we have a group of n observable random variables 
such as x", $%, … , $' with means (", (%, …	('. According to the above definition of 
FA, after using this technique, we get some *+,  associated with k unobserved 
variables -,. The mathematical equation can be expressed as follows: 																																															$+ − (+ = *+"-" + ⋯+ *+2-2 + 3+                                        (1) 
Here, 4 ∈ 1, … , 7, 8 ∈ 1,… , 9,	 and 9 < 7.  The error term is 3+ , which is 
independently distributed with a zero mean and finite variance. Here, Fs can be 
referred to as factors or latent unobserved variables. In addition, $< are observed 
variables. The equation simply conveys that we can use fewer factors to express 
the association among a higher number of observed variables by using FA 
techniques. 
    In particular, we have a common factor model or one factor model. In this case, 
it would be 
                                                   	$" − (" = *""- + 3" 
                                                    $% − (% = *%"- + 3% 
                                                                 …                                                                         (2) 
                                                    $' − (' = *'"- + 3'                                                                                                 
where $< are the observed variables, F is the common factor, *s are associated 
factor loadings and 3s are error terms or uniqueness.  
 
2.2.3   Types 
There are generally two types of FA: exploratory FA and confirmatory FA. The 
exploratory FA technique helps researchers to identify the complicated 
interrelationship among variables and factors. Confirmatory FA is used to test 
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the hypothesis of the association between observed variables and unobserved 
variables. The most significant difference between these two techniques is 
whether a hypothesis concerning the association of the variables is introduced. 
Additionally, unlike exploratory FA, confirmatory FA is mainly used to predict 
latent factors and the associated structures in the original dataset. 
 
2.2.4   Terminology  
FA uses several specific terms. The first is factor loadings, which captures the 
correlation coefficients between the corresponding observed variables and latent 
factors. Additionally, the squared factor loading reveals the percentage of the 
variance that can be explained by the factor. The sum of the squared factor 
loadings for all factors for a given variable is called communality. Communality 
measures the percentage of variance of a given variable that is explained jointly 
by all the latent factors, which can be an indicator of whether the model is suitable. 
The variance that cannot be accounted for by the latent factor is uniqueness, which 
equals one minus communality. Additionally, the number of factors are decided 
by the eigenvalue. Eigenvalue describes the variance explained by the latent factor, 
which indicates the explanatory power of the latent factor based on the variables. 
Thus, a higher eigenvalue indicates a more powerful latent factor. Specifically, 
the latent factor and its structure can express the set of observed variables more 
accurately. The last related term is factor scores. Factor scores refers to the scores of 
each set of variables on each factor. By using FA techniques, each observation 
eventually receives its respective scores. In addition, by multiplying the score by 
the associated observation, the latent variable value of this observation can be 
obtained.  
 
2.2.5   Criteria for determining the number of factors 
There are several criteria for determining the number of factors, the most notable 
of which are the Kaiser criterion, the variance explained criterion, scree plot, 
Horn’s parallel analysis and Velicer’s MAP test. The Kaiser criterion is the one 
that is most commonly used and is the default for most statistical software, such 
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as Stata and SPSS. According to the Kaiser criterion, all the factors with 
eigenvalues below 1 will be dropped. 
 
2.3   Construction of the Trust index using FA 
I assume that one common factor can be used to explain the variance of trust. 
Each component is predicted to positively contribute to the “trust index”. Thus, 
I apply the confirmatory common factor model.  
First, I illustrate the correlation matrix of the components, and the results are 
shown in Table 1. Second, the FA is applied and the eigenvalues for each possible 
factor and the corresponding factor loadings are collected. The FA output can be 
found in Table 2.a. According to the Kaiser criteria, the number of retained factors 
should be one, which is consistent with the assumption of the common factor 
model. To further verify the number of factors, the scree plot is illustrated and 
shown in Figure 1, which also suggests the common factor model.  
 
 
 
            Figure 1.  Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor analysis 
 
    The factor loadings and the unique variances between each component and the 
factors are shown in Table 2.b. Since the retained number of factors is one, only 
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Factor 1 would be applied. The first column in Table 2.b illustrates how the 
common factor (Factor 1) captures each component. Specifically, the common 
factor “trust index” is positively correlated to each observed component. 
Moreover, the high factor loadings suggest the stronger contribution of latent 
factors to the observed components. I follow the majority of studies and use 0.3 
as the limit (Comrey and Lee 1992; Hair et al. 1998). In my case, all the factor 
loadings are above 0.3, which means that the latent “trust index” effectively 
captures all the characteristics of the observed components. Finally, the factor 
scores for each component with a standardised unit are predicted using the 
regression scores method 2 . The scores are shown in Table 3, and all the 
components positively contribute to the trust index, which is consistent with the 
previous assumption. Among the components, law and order has the highest 
factor score, which indicates that a standardised unit increase in the law and order 
component is associated with a 0.25 standardised unit increase in the latent “trust 
index”.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
2 The maximum likelihood (ML) method is only one of several methods used for confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). When one or more of the components is categorical, the regression scores method is more 
appropriate. 
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Table 1.  Correlation matrix of the components 
` Bureaucracy 
quality 
Law and 
order 
Corruption Investment 
profile 
Ethnic 
tensions  
Religious 
tensions 
Internal 
conflict 
Socioeconomic 
conditions 
School 
enrolment 
Bureaucracy quality 1.0000         
Law and order 0.6804 1.0000        
Corruption 0.6739 0.6289 1.0000       
Investment profile 0.4814 0.4337 0.1961 1.0000      
Ethnic tensions 0.3528 0.5212 0.3668 0.2446 1.0000     
Religious tensions 0.2930 0.3831 0.3654 0.2077 0.3959 1.0000    
Internal conflict 0.5311 0.7499 0.4490 0.4581 0.6042 0.4520 1.0000   
Socioeconomic 
conditions 
0.6295 0.5812 0.4829 0.5820 0.3058 0.2323 0.4670 1.0000  
School enrolment 0.6553 0.6218 0.4674 0.4876 0.4335 0.3184 0.5386 0.5212 1.0000 
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Table 2. a.  Factor analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.3966 3.8591 0.9112 0.9112 
Factor 2 0.5375 0.1572 0.1114 1.0226 
Factor 3 0.3803 0.3445 0.0788 1.1014 
Factor 4 0.0358 0.0205 0.0074 1.1088 
Factor 5 0.0153 0.0896 0.0032 1.1120 
Factor 6 -0.0743 0.0274 -0.0154 1.0966 
Factor 7 -0.1016 0.0686 -0.0211 1.0755 
Factor 8 -0.1702 0.0240 -0.0353 1.0402 
Factor 9 -0.1942 - -0.0402 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. b.  Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniquen
ess 
Bureaucracy quality 0.8078 -0.2271 -0.2066 0.0238 -0.0264 0.2519 
Law and order 0.8605 0.0990 -0.0439 -0.1190 -0.0234 0.2331 
Corruption 0.6841 0.0468 -0.4110 0.0081 0.0338 0.3597 
Investment profile 0.5751 -0.3135 0.3284 0.0197 0.0233 0.4623 
Ethnic tensions 0.5813 0.3468 0.1123 0.0385 -0.0094 0.5276 
Religious tensions 0.4639 0.2777 0.0165 0.0938 0.0549 0.6956 
Internal conflict 0.7845 0.2647 0.2055 -0.0574 0.0025 0.2690 
Socioeconomic 
conditions 
0.7015 -0.3144 0.0456 -0.0210 0.0574 0.4032 
School enrolment 0.7377 -0.0963 0.0418 0.0815 -0.0775 0.4321 
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Table 3.  Scoring coefficients (method= regression) 
Variable Factor 1 
Bureaucracy quality 0.2124 
Law and order 0.2453 
Corruption 0.1111 
Investment profile 0.0892 
Ethnic tensions 0.0823 
Religious tensions 0.0590 
Internal conflict 0.1944 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.1240 
School enrolment 0.1268 
 
The acceptability of the common FA model has been confirmed based on three 
aspects. First, the overall goodness of fit is examined. The p-value of chi2 is close to 
zero, which indicates that the common FA model is meaningful. Second, the 
interpretability, strength, and statistical significance of the estimated parameters have 
been reviewed. In my case, the parameters are of a magnitude and direction consistent 
with expectations and the existing empirical evidence. Finally, the measures of 
sampling adequacy are checked by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test. Table 4 
explains the KMO test results. Generally, the overall KMO test score must be above 
0.5. The KMO value here is 0.867, which is considered a good indication of the 
usefulness and the adequate quality of the components and the FA model.  
Finally, I obtain the trust index for 136 countries from 1984 to 2008. A high value on 
the trust index indicates a higher trust level. I also explore the average trust level 
rankings for the 136 countries over the period 1984-2008. Finland has the highest trust 
level, and the Republic of the Congo lies at the opposite end of the ranking. Generally, 
northern European countries rank in the top quarter, while African, Middle Eastern 
and South American countries tend to have low trust among their populations. The 
full ranking of the average trust index for the 136 countries are shown in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable KMO 
Bureaucracy quality 0.8667 
Law and order 0.8771 
Corruption 0.8206 
Investment profile 0.8022 
Ethnic tensions 0.8891 
Religious tensions 0.8967 
Internal conflict 0.8427 
Socioeconomic conditions 0.8910 
School enrolment 0.9234 
Overall 0.8670 
 
3   Comparison with trust survey results 
As mentioned, generalised trust data are usually obtained from the WVS. The WVS is 
a worldwide longitudinal dataset managed by the University of Michigan. It has 
provided questionnaires about people’s values and beliefs since 1981 (Abramson and 
Inglehart 1995). The measure of trust from the trust survey is generated with respect 
to the percentage of respondents who answer “Most people can be trusted” to the 
survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?” Currently, the WVS 
provides data for 5 waves: wave I over the period 1981-1984, wave II over the period 
1990-1994, wave III over the period 1995-1998, wave IV over the period 1999-2004 and 
wave V over the period 2005-2008. Initially, I took all the observations from wave I to 
wave V as the trust survey sample. In total, the trust survey sample contains 100 
countries. Since the trust survey data are not continuous and most of the countries 
only joined one or two waves out of five, it is impossible to generate a trust value for 
each country in every wave. To illustrate the variation of trust values among 100 
countries, I take the average over five waves to represent the trust level for each 
country. In the sample, Norway is the country with the highest level of trust at more 
than 66% of the population trusting others. By contrast, Trinidad and Tobago ranks 
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the lowest with only 3.8% of the population trusting others. The full ranking list of 
trust levels measured by the WVS trust question can be seen in Appendix 2. 
    To compare the ranking of my trust index and the trust survey, I find 85 common 
countries from the above two samples and reorganise the rankings for these countries. 
Appendix 3 illustrates the comparisons of the rankings for these countries in terms of 
the two measures of trust identified above. I should emphasise that the rationale 
behind this comparison is informational purposes rather than making statements 
about how well my index corresponds to the “correct” ordering of a country’s trust 
level. I find some countries that illustrate very distinct rankings in the two indices 
(trust survey ranking and trust index ranking) and show them in Table 2.5. In the trust 
survey ranking, countries such as Luxembourg, France, Portugal, Slovenia, Cyprus 
and Malaysia surprisingly rank around and below the average level of trust, while 
relatively high trust levels have been found in China, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Iraq and India. In particular, Luxembourg ranks 40, placing it behind 
Vietnam (9) and India (22) in the trust survey ranking. However, in the trust index 
ranking, Luxembourg ranks 3, which is just behind Finland (1) and the Netherlands 
(2). Similarly, France ranks at 53, which is below the average trust level in the trust 
survey ranking; by contrast, it ranks 19 in the trust index, which places it in the top 
quarter. By contrast, China ranks 5 in the trust survey ranking, but it is just above the 
average trust level at 41 in the trust index ranking. Following the same pattern, 
Vietnam ranks 9 in the trust survey and 58 in the trust index ranking.  
I further investigate the similarity between the trust index and the measurement of 
the trust survey. Initially, the scatter plot (Figure 2.2) between the measurement of the 
trust survey and trust index suggests an obvious positive correlation. This highly 
positive correlation has also been confirmed by Table 2.6. The value 3.456 reveals that 
the measurements of the trust survey are positively related to the trust index and are 
highly statistically significant. One additional standardised unit increase in the 
measure of the trust survey leads to an increase of 0.52 standardised units in the trust 
index. 
Even though there are several differences between the measurements of the trust 
survey and the trust index in terms of ranking. The highly positive correlation 
between these two suggests that the trust index can then be used to calculate the trust 
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level when the trust value is not available in the WVS. 
 
Table 5.  Subsample of the Trust Index ranking and Trust Survey ranking 
Country Trust Index ranking Survey ranking Difference 
Luxembourg 3 40 37 
France 19 53 34 
Portugal 20 67 47 
Slovenia 24 63 39 
Cyprus 29 77 48 
Saudi Arabia 39 6 33 
Malaysia 40 78 38 
China 41 5 36 
Brazil 49 84 35 
Vietnam 58 9 49 
Iran 60 24 36 
Egypt 65 33 32 
India 66 22 44 
Indonesia 77 11 66 
Ethiopia 81 46 35 
Pakistan 82 34 48 
Bangladesh 83 51 32 
Nigeria 84 52 32 
Iraq 85 13 72 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot between measure of trust survey and trust index  
 
Table 6.  Pooled regression between trust survey and trust index 
  Trust index 
Trust survey   3.456*** 
  (0.556) 
   
Constant  -0.799*** 
  (0.171) 
Sample Size 
R-square 
  85 
0.3178 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Trust index and trust survey are measured over the period 1984-2008.				 
 
4   The correlation between the trust index and economic 
performance  
Earlier studies mainly explore the cross-sectional effect of trust measured by the trust 
survey variable obtained from the WVS regarding economic activity variables such as 
GDP per capita and investment rate. Knack and Keefer (1997) suggest that the average 
trust level is strongly associated with GDP per capita across countries. Putnam et al. 
(1993) also document the cross-region effect of trust on economic development in Italy. 
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Cross-country studies on the effect of trust have also been conducted by La Porta et al. 
(1997), Whiteley (2000), Zak and Knack (2001), Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), Bjørnskov 
(2006b), Knowles (2006), Berggren et al. (2008), Neira et al. (2009), Tabellini (2010), and 
Dincer and Uslaner (2010). There are fewer studies of panel data analysis on the 
correlation between trust and economic performance3, which could be due to the 
severe issue of missing observations of the trust data from the WVS and the estimation 
results based on that data tending to be not robust in the panel fixed effect model (Hall 
and Ahmad 2013). Therefore, I explore the effect of trust (measured by the trust index) 
on FDI and income inequality using a panel data analysis.  
 
4.1   Trust and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Trust has been routinely considered to be an essential element for most economic 
transactions (Blau 1964). The impact of trust on economic growth has been widely 
investigated (such as Putnam et al. 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; Woolcock 1998; 
Knowles 2006; Tabellini 2010; Algan and Cahuc 2013). While FDI is one of the most 
significant contributors to economic growth (Borensztein et al. 1998), the influence of 
trust on FDI has rarely been examined4.   
Trust could promote FDI mainly through two channels. First, a high level of trust 
effectively cultivates a cooperative business environment, which facilitates FDI 
activities. Trust has been seen as the “expectation of regular, honest cooperative 
behaviour” (Bhardwaj et al. 2007), which could lessen the probability of opportunism 
and strengthen the transparency of economic exchange (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Hill 
1990). Earlier studies suggest that people are more likely to trust others in a society 
with a high trust level, which results in a cooperative relationship that facilitates 
economic achievement (Miller 1992; Mcknight et al. 1998; Das and Teng 2000). From 
the multinational enterprises’ perspective, a cooperative business environment in the 
host country is helpful to making FDI (Zhao and Kim 2011) profitable. Second, trust 
can enhance contract enforcement (Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997), which is 
mainly due to trust promoting compliance with property rights and business rules 
																																								 																				
3 There is limited research using panel data analysis on the effect of trust on economic growth; see, for example, 
Perez et al. (2006), Baliamoune-Lutz (2011) and Hall and Ahmand (2013). 
4 Few studies have explored the role of trust on FDI. Those that have include the recent work of Bhardwaj et al.  
(2007) and Zhao and Kim (2011). They adopt the trust survey from the WVS as the measurement of trust. 
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and norms (Adler and Kwon 2002). Furthermore, trust could reduce transaction costs 
by mitigating conflicts and monitoring costs (Fukuyama 1995; Meyerson et al. 1996). 
In addition, positive FDI performances can signal a high trust level in the society and 
attract even more foreign investors.   
 
    
Figure 3.  Scatter plot for FDI inflows (% GDP) in logarithm form and trust                         
index 
 
    To investigate the effect of trust level on FDI inflows, I first build the trust index by 
using the method in section 2.3 for the period from 1984 to 2014. The upward line in 
Figure 3 illustrates the positive correlation between the trust index and FDI inflows 
(ln (FDI/GDP)) for 139 countries over the period 1984-2014. This correlation implies 
that a high level of trust in host country is more attractive for foreign investors. 
Additionally, the casual relationship between trust and FDI inflows is empirically 
tested by the following model: 
                         ln	((%&'(&))+,-) = /0 + /23+,-42 + /56+,- + a+ + 8+-                                       (3)        
where FDI is the FDI net inflows, and T represents trust level. In this model, the first 
lag of the trust index is applied. X captures a vector of control variables such as school 
enrolment, trade rate and growth rate. Item a+ captures the unobserved effects. The 
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idiosyncratic error term is 8+-, and it should be uncorrelated with each explanatory 
variable across all time periods, namely, E 8+- 6+, :+ = 0. Also 8+- are homoscedastic 
and serially uncorrelated with Var 8+- 6+, :+ = >:? 8+- = @A5  and Cov	 8+-, 8+E 6+, :+ = 0, for all t=1, …, T and t	 ≠ s. The FDI data and all the controls 
are collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
     Table 7 presents the estimation results between FDI and trust by applying the 
pooled OLS regression method. In model (1), the trust index is positively associated 
with FDI at 1% significant level. The coefficient of the trust index becomes 
insignificant but remains positive after controlling for education, trade rate and other 
determinants of FDI in model (2).  
 
Table 7.  Pooled OLS regression between trust and FDI inflows 
 (1)    (2) 
Trust index (t-1) 0.371*** 0.063 
 (0.033) (0.048) 
   
Education  0.006*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Trade rate  0.012*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Annual growth rate  0.047*** 
  (0.007) 
   
Constant 0.449*** -1.137*** 
 (0.030) (0.118) 
Sample Size 
No. of Countries 
R-square 
2463 
133 
0.050 
2127 
131 
0.218 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is FDI inflows 
measured as FDI net inflows (% of GDP). The trust index is the one built using FA. Education is 
measured as secondary school enrolment (% gross); the trade rate is measured as trade (% of GDP); and 
the annual growth rate is measured as GDP growth (annual %).     
    
    Regarding the endogeneity problem, possible issues for the panel data analysis 
could include potential reverse causality and heterogeneity due to unobserved 
characteristics. This model is less likely to have any reverse causality issues for two 
reasons. First, I apply the lagged trust index to the regression model. Additionally, the 
previous literature suggests no causality from FDI to trust (Zhao and Kim 2011). Since 
the potential heteroscedasticity could result in a biased estimation in the pooled OLS 
model, I also employ the fixed effects and random effects models. The estimation 
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results are shown in Table 8; both random and fixed effects reveal that economies with 
high trust levels result in positive FDI inflows.  
 
Table 8.  Fixed effects and random effects model between trust and FDI inflow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trust index(t-1) 0.665*** 0.369***   
 (0.070) (0.063)   
     
Trust index(t-2)   0.556***  
   (0.069)  
     
Trust index(t-3)    0.510*** 
    (0.068) 
     
Education 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Trade rate 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Annual growth rate 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Constant -2.977*** -1.759*** -2.989*** -2.761*** 
 (0.188) (0.173) (0.194) (0.201) 
Methodology fe re fe fe 
Sample Size 
No. of Countries 
R-square 
2127 
131 
0.251 
2127 
131 
0.269 
2002 
128 
0.256 
1898 
128 
0.257 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is FDI inflows 
measured as FDI net inflows (% of GDP). The trust index is the one built using FA. Education is 
measured as secondary school enrolment (% gross); the trade rate is measured as trade (% of GDP); and 
the annual growth rate is measured as GDP growth (annual %). The unobserved effect a+ is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with each control variable in all periods under the random regression model. 
 
    According to the Hausman test (see Appendix 5), the fixed effects model is more 
efficient. Based on the estimation results of fixed effects model (1), a one standard 
deviation increase in the trust index (t-1) would lead to a 63.8% increase in the rate of 
FDI inflows (%GDP). Model (1) in Table 8 also reveals that education level, trade rate 
and growth rate positively contribute to FDI inflows, which is consistent with the 
previous literature. In models (3) and (4), I further explore how historical trust levels 
influence current FDI inflows by using a fixed effects model. Both models uncover the 
important role played by the historical trust level.  
    Since there is a difference between OECD countries and non-OECD countries in 
terms of the level of development, I then examine the influence of trust index on FDI 
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for these two groups of countries. Table 9 illustrates the estimation results between 
FDI and different historical levels of the trust index by applying a fixed effects model. 
As shown in Table 9, the coefficients of trust are all positive and significant for OECD 
and non-OECD countries. Therefore, trust is an important determinant of FDI for both 
OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 
Table 9.  Fixed effects estimations between trust and FDI inflow for OECD and non-OECD 
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust index (t-1) 0.569***   0.680***   
 (0.138)   (0.084)   
       
Trust index (t-2)  0.574***   0.540***  
  (0.135)   (0.082)  
       
Trust index (t-3)   0.627***   0.463*** 
   (0.132)   (0.082) 
       
Education 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Trade rate 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Annual growth rate 0.019* 0.024** 0.023* 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Constant -3.338*** -3.207*** -2.976*** -2.568*** -2.653*** -2.506*** 
 (0.364) (0.377) (0.393) (0.223) (0.231) (0.242) 
Classification OECD OECD OECD non-OECD non-OECD non-OECD 
Sample Size 
No. of Countries 
R-square 
741 
34 
0.442 
710 
34 
0.479 
680 
34 
0.477 
1386 
97 
0.226 
1292 
94 
0.232 
1218 
94 
0.229 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is FDI inflows 
measured as FDI net inflows (% of GDP). The trust index is the one built using FA. Education is 
measured as secondary school enrolment (% gross); the trade rate is measured as trade (% of GDP); and 
the annual growth rate is measured as GDP growth (annual %). 
 
4.2   Trust and income inequality   
The correlation between income inequality and trust has received considerable 
attention. A high level of trust has been linked to low income inequality. Individuals 
with high levels of trust tend to have a stronger sense of fairness and care more about 
others in society (Ram 2013). Therefore, citizens in a society with a high trust level are 
more willing to accept redistribution, which would mitigate income inequality (Algan 
and Cahuc 2013). By contrast, income inequality could be detrimental to the strength 
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of social trust. Since inequality might make people feel unfairly treated and exploited, 
social trust would decline as inequality increases.  
 
	
Figure 4.  Scatter plot for Gini coefficient and trust index 
 
    As shown in Figure 4, income inequality (the Gini coefficient) and the trust index 
(built in section 4.1) are negatively correlated for 104 countries over the period from 
1984 to 2014. High trust countries are associated with low income inequality (a lower 
Gini coefficient). However, countries with a low level of trust are generally related to 
high income inequality (a higher Gini coefficient). The effect of income inequality on 
generalised trust has been empirically studied by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and 
Jordahl (2007). However, the influence of generalised trust on income inequality is 
seldom investigated5.     
To examine the influence of trust on the Gini coefficient, I employ the following 
econometric model: 																															ln IJKJ+,- = /0 + /23+,-42 + /56+,- + :+ + L+,-                                      (4) 
																																								 																				
5 Algan and Cahuc (2013) illustrate the only cross-country study addressing how trust influences income inequality 
by employing the pooled OLS regression model.  
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where IJKJ+,- represents the Gini coefficient for country i at time t. A high value for 
the Gini coefficient corresponds to a high level of income inequality in the country. 
Again, T refers to trust and is the same index developed in section 4.1. X captures a 
panel of explanatory variables including education level, income level, trade rate, 
inflation rate and government cost. The unobserved item is a+. The idiosyncratic error 
term is L+- and should be uncorrelated with each explanatory variable across all time 
periods, namely, E L+- 6+, :+ = 0. Also L+- is homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated 
with Var L+- 6+, :+ = >:? L+- = @M5  and Cov	 L+-, L+E 6+, :+ = 0 for all t=1, …, T and t	 ≠ s. The Gini coefficient and all the control variable data are collected from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   
    At first, I ignore all the endogeneity problems and adopt the pooled OLS regression 
method. Models (1) and (2) in Table 10 show the robust negative correlation between 
the trust index and the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient would decrease 
approximately 13.1% from a one standard deviation increase in one period lag of the 
trust index. By controlling other determinants of income inequality, the effect of the 
trust level decreases; a one standard deviation increase in the historical trust level 
leads to a 10% decrease in income inequality. 
To eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, I also apply the fixed effects and random 
effects estimation models. The estimated coefficients of the trust index (Table 11) from 
these two models are all positive yet statistically insignificant, which could be due to 
the large amount of missing data regarding the Gini coefficient or the potential causal 
effect that income inequality should have on trust. Earlier studies show that income 
inequality can undermine generalised trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Jordahl 2007). 
Two methods are used to further explore the exact correlation between trust and 
income inequality. The first applies the between regression model to investigate cross-
sectional information between income inequality and its determinants at a particular 
trust level. The other method uses the index of the historical trust level in the 
regression model to eliminate the reverse correlation between trust and income 
inequality.   
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Table 10.  Pooled OLS regression between Gini and trust 
 (1) (2) 
Trust index (t-1) -0.137*** -0.105** 
 (0.026) (0.045) 
   
Education   -0.002* 
(0.001) 
   
Income   0.053 
(0.042) 
   
Trade rate  
 
 
Inflation rate 
 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.000) 
 
Government cost 
 
 -0.010* 
(0.005) 
   
Constant 3.665*** 3.574*** 
 (0.026) (0.345) 
Sample Size 696 553 
No. of Countries 103 95 
R-square 0.187 0.292 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is GINI 
coefficients. The trust index is the one built using FA. Education measured as secondary school 
enrolment (% gross). Income is measured as the logarithm form of GDP per capita. The trade rate is 
measured as trade (% of GDP). The inflation rate is measured as the GDP deflator (annual %). 
Government cost is measured as the general government’s final consumption expenditure (% of GDP).  
 
    The between regression estimator in Table 11 (model 3) shows that trust index (t-1) 
negatively contributes to income inequality with statistical significance at the 5% level. 
In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the trust index is associated with an 
average 11.8% decrease in the Gini coefficient across countries. This coefficient is 
smaller than the one from the OLS regression since this estimator is based on the 
regression of the mean values of the trust index of each country. These results, as well 
as the ones from OLS regression model, show the robust negative correlation between 
income inequality and trust level across countries. Compare the estimators from 
model (1) and (2) with (3) in Table 11; the positive coefficients of trust level in models 
(1) and (2) are presumably due to the lack of Gini coefficient data from each country. 
This can be verified by the fact that the available data for the Gini coefficient are only 
938 observations among 139 countries with 31-year periods (see Appendix 4).    
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Table 11.  Fixed effects, random effects and between regression of Gini and trust 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Trust index (t-1) 0.022 0.004 -0.123** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.061) 
    
Education  0.0003 8.27e-06 -0.003* 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Income  -0.048 -0.057 0.062 
 
 
(0.049) (0.036) (0.053) 
Trade rate  
 
 
Inflation rate 
 
 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.00004 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.00004 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
Government cost 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Constant 4.032*** 4.151*** 3.268*** 
 (0.430) (0.294) (0.445) 
Methodology fe re be 
Sample Size 553 553 553 
No. of Countries 
R-square 
95 
0.04 
95 
0.143 
95 
0.251 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is GINI 
coefficients. The trust index is the one built using FA. Education measured as secondary school 
enrolment (% gross). Income is measured as the logarithm form of GDP per capita. The trade rate is 
measured as trade (% of GDP). The inflation rate is measured as the GDP deflator (annual %). 
Government cost measured as the general government’s final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). 
The unobserved effect a+ is assumed to be uncorrelated with each control variable in all periods under 
the random regression model.     
 
To further explore the causality between trust and income inequality, I then employ 
the historical level of the trust index in the regression model even though the 
estimated coefficients of the historical trust index are still statistically insignificant. 
The estimated coefficient of second and third time lag of the trust index reveal a 
negative correlation between historical trust level and income inequality from the 
random effects model (models 5 and 6 from Table 12). The between regression 
estimations again confirm the negative relation between trust level and income 
inequality across countries by employing the earlier trust level in Table 12.  
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Table 12. Correlation between historical Gini and trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) (7)    (8)   (9) 
Trust index 0.022 
(0.021) 
  0.004 
(0.021) 
  -0.123** 
(0.061) 
  
(t-1)       
          
Trust index  0.006 
(0.017) 
  -0.005 
(0.016) 
  -0.129** 
(0.055) 
 
(t-2)       
          
Trust index    0.003 
(0.015) 
  -0.005 
(0.015) 
  -0.085* 
(0.048) (t-3)       
          
education 0.0003 0.001 0.001 8.27e-06 0.0002 0.0004 -0.003* -0.003** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          
income -0.048 -0.055 -0.047 -0.057 -0.060* -0.060* 0.062 0.074 0.016 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048) 
          
Trade rate 0.0002 0.0001 1.53e-06 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation  
rate 
-0.00004 
(0.000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00004 
(0.000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
Government  
cost 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
          
Constant 4.032*** 
(0.430) 
4.120*** 
(0.431) 
4.028*** 
(0.419) 
4.151*** 
(0.294) 
4.187*** 
(0.286) 
4.170*** 
(0.267) 
3.268*** 
(0.445) 
3.178*** 
(0.408) 
3.714*** 
(0.381)  
Method fe fe fe re re re be be be 
N 553 541 511 553 541 511 553 541 511 
No. of 
countries 95 96 93 95 96 93 95 96 93 
R-square 0.040 0.075 0.103 0.143 0.142 0.158 0.251 0.290 0.240 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is Gini coefficients. The 
trust index is the one built using FA. Education measured as secondary school enrolment (% gross). Income is 
measured as the logarithm form of GDP per capita. The trade rate is measured as trade (% of GDP). The inflation 
rate is measured as the GDP deflator (annual %). Government cost measured as the general government’s final 
consumption expenditure (% of GDP). The unobserved effect a+ is assumed to be uncorrelated with each control 
variable in all periods under the random regression model.     
 
    Considering the difference in terms of the original country characteristics and the 
availability of the Gini coefficient data, I again classified the whole dataset into two 
groups of OECD and non-OECD countries and investigated how trust influences the 
Gini coefficient for these two groups. Regarding the availability of Gini coefficient 
data, we have 252 and 686 separate observations for OECD and non-OECD countries, 
respectively. In other words, the Gini coefficient data for each OECD country are 
larger on average than each non-OECD country. The scatter plot between Gini 
coefficients and the trust index for OECD and non-OECD country groups are shown 
in Appendix 6. At first glance, this depicts an obvious negative relation between the 
Gini coefficient and the trust index for the OECD group but a vague correlation for 
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non-OECD countries. An econometric approach will be used to explain the correlation 
between trust and income inequality for OECD and non-OECD groups.  
 
Table 13.  Random effect of Gini and trust for OECD and non-OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust index (t-1) -0.065***   0.024   
 (0.022)   (0.024)   
       
Trust index (t-2) 
 
 
Trust index (t-3) 
 -0.040* 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
-0.040* 
(0.023) 
 0.003 
(0.018) 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.016) 
       
Education  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
       
Income  0.012 0.009 0.027 -0.024 -0.029 -0.031 
 
 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.048) (0.045) (0.043) 
Trade rate  
 
 
Inflation rate 
 
 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
0.0001 
(0.000) 
 
-7.47e-06 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0001 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
 
Government cost 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
Constant 3.767*** 
(0.521) 
3.791*** 
(0.526) 
3.593*** 
(0.497) 
3.860*** 
(0.390) 
3.898*** 
(0.371) 
3.908*** 
(0.350) 
Classification 
Sample Size 
OECD 
196 
OECD 
192 
OECD 
186 
non-OECD 
357 
non-OECD 
349 
non-OECD 
325 
No. of countries 
R-square 
30 
0.667 
30 
0.651 
30 
0.620 
65 
0.071 
66 
0.078 
63 
0.027 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes: All variables are measured over the period 1984-2014. The dependent variable is Gini coefficients. 
The trust index is the one built using FA. Education measured as secondary school enrolment (% gross). 
Income is measured as the logarithm form of GDP per capita. The trade rate is measured as trade (% of 
GDP). The inflation rate is measured as the GDP deflator (annual %). Government cost measured as 
the general government’s final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). The unobserved effect a+  is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with each control variable in all periods under the random regression 
model.     
 
    Based on the estimation results in Table 11, I applied the Hausman test for the fixed 
effects regression model and random effects regression model. According to the 
Hausman test (see Appendix B.7), the random effects regression model is more 
appropriate. Thus, the random effects model is applied for OECD and non-OECD 
groups, and the results are illustrated in Table 13. For the OECD countries, the 
different historical levels of the trust index are significantly negative when correlated 
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with income inequality according to models (1) - (3) in Table 13. However, there is no 
significant effect of trust on income inequality among non-OECD countries. These 
results suggest that trust can effectively mitigate the income inequality issue among 
the OECD group. Apparently, the initial trust level is relatively high among the OECD 
countries, and the income inequality issue can improve as the trust level becomes 
stronger. However, the income inequality problem cannot be alleviated in non-OECD 
countries, as the improvement of trust level could be due to idiosyncratic conditions 
among the non-OECD countries.     
 
5   Conclusion 
The primary goal of this paper is to explore a new measure of trust. My motivation is 
to determine whether there is a simpler and less demanding alternative trust index 
for the purpose of ranking countries and exploring the effects of trust on economic 
performance. The current measures of trust are mainly produced by trust survey 
questionnaires and experimental results from trust games. However, because of the 
aforementioned limitations arising from ambiguous trust results obtained from trust 
surveys and experiments, an inter-temporal and cross-country analysis on trust 
becomes extremely difficult.    
The trust index is constructed using the FA technique in order to assign weights to 
all the various characteristics that are generally considered to be determinants of 
generalised trust, which include the following: (i) the level of corruption and 
bureaucratic quality, (ii) law and order, (iii) investment profile, (iv) religious and/or 
ethnic tensions, (v) socioeconomic conditions, (vi) internal conflict, and (vii) 
secondary school enrolment. Compared to the trust survey measure, the ranking of 
countries in the trust index is more consistent with people’s perception.  
This paper also contributes to the literature by adding the panel data study of the 
effects of trust on both FDI and income inequality. As a result, trust is revealed to play 
a significantly positive role in FDI for both OECD and non-OECD countries by 
employing the fixed effects model. With regard to income inequality, the random 
regression models show that trust is more pronounced among the OECD countries. 
    Generally, this paper draws on the apparent inconsistencies between self-reported 
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trust levels and actual behaviour in trust games and constructs an alternative index 
composed of characteristics that have been shown to determine trust levels. Of course, 
this is a first attempt in this direction. As a result, further empirical testing may be 
required to settle the unavoidable debate over the most appropriate and relevant 
components of this index. By no means do I believe that the results from trust surveys 
should be disregarded. However, given the inconsistencies between self-reported and 
actual behaviour, as well as the significant differences in the rankings reproduced 
from the survey results and the index of components that affect generalised trust, 
further research on the (perhaps) most appropriate measures of trust to be used in 
empirical analysis is certainly still needed.     
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Appendix  
Appendix 1.  Summary of the components for trust index 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Bureaucracy quality 3226 2.1322 1.2015 0 4 
Law and order 3226 3.6556 1.5052 0 6 
Corruption 3226 3.0498 1.3788 0 6 
Investment profile 3226 7.0856 2.5294 0 12 
Ethnic tensions 3226 3.9411 1.4719 0 6 
Religious tensions 3226 4.5717 1.3630 0 6 
Internal conflict 3226 8.7349 2.6904 0 12 
Socioeconomic conditions 3226 5.6786 2.2441 0 11 
School enrolment 2538 71.1580 31.7898 0 160.619 
 
 
Appendix 2.  List of average Trust Index ranking and Trust Survey ranking 
Country 
Trust Index 
ranking Country 
Trust 
Survey 
ranking 
Finland 1 Norway 1 
Netherlands 2 Sweden 2 
Luxembourg 3 Denmark 3 
Denmark 4 Finland 4 
Sweden 5 China 5 
Norway 6 Saudi Arabia 6 
Switzerland 7 Netherlands 7 
Australia 8 New Zealand 8 
Iceland 9 Viet Nam 9 
New Zealand 10 Switzerland 10 
Austria 11 Indonesia 11 
Canada 12 Canada 12 
United States 13 Iraq 13 
Japan 14 Australia 14 
Germany 15 Japan 15 
United Kingdom 16 Iceland 16 
Ireland 17 Ireland 17 
Belgium 18 Thailand 18 
Brunei 19 Northern Ireland 19 
France 20 United States 20 
Portugal 21 Hong Kong 21 
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Hong Kong SAR China 22 Great Britain 22 
Czech Republic 23 India 23 
Hungary 24 Germany 24 
Slovenia 25 Iran 25 
Italy 26 Austria 26 
Spain 27 Spain 27 
Slovak Republic 28 Republic of Korea 28 
Korea 29 Belgium 29 
Cyprus 30 Italy 30 
Malta 31 Germany West 31 
Croatia 32 Taiwan 32 
The Bahamas 33 Ukraine 33 
Estonia 34 Jordan 34 
Latvia 35 Belarus 35 
Greece 36 South Korea 36 
Poland 37 Egypt 37 
Lithuania 38 Pakistan 38 
Chile 39 Serbia and Montenegro 39 
Namibia 40 Russian Federation 40 
Botswana 41 Bulgaria 41 
Bulgaria 42 Hungary 42 
Saudi Arabia 43 Czech Republic 43 
Oman 44 Dominican Republic 44 
Kazakhstan 45 Luxembourg 45 
Malaysia 46 Lithuania 46 
Costa Rica 47 Mexico 47 
Bahrain 48 Albania 48 
Qatar 49 Uruguay 49 
Kuwait 50 Armenia 50 
China 51 Ethiopia 51 
Argentina 52 Estonia 52 
Cuba 53 Greece 53 
Israel 54 Israel 54 
Thailand 55 Poland 55 
Tunisia 56 Bangladesh 56 
Mongolia 57 Nigeria 57 
Azerbaijan 58 France 58 
Mexico 59 Bosnia and Herzegovina 59 
Uruguay 60 Croatia 60 
Belarus 61 Malta 61 
Brazil 62 Slovakia 62 
Moldova 63 Latvia 63 
Romania 64 Azerbaijan 64 
Côte d’ivoire 65 Chile 65 
Morocco 66 Andorra 66 
Ukraine 67 Morocco 67 
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South Africa 68 Argentina 68 
Jordan 69 South Africa 69 
Trinidad and Tobago 70 Georgia 70 
Bolivia 71 Republic of Moldova 71 
Albania 72 Slovenia 72 
Libya 73 Moldova 73 
United Arab Emirates 74 Mali 74 
Syrian Arab Republic 75 Singapore 75 
Jamaica 76 Romania 76 
Vietnam 77 Kyrgyzstan 77 
Ecuador 78 Portugal 78 
Dominican Republic 79 Guatemala 79 
Iran 80 Serbia 80 
Gabon 81 Venezuela 81 
Russia 82 Burkina Faso 82 
Lebanon 83 El Salvador 83 
Venezuela 84 Puerto Rico 84 
The Gambia 85 Colombia 85 
Turkey 86 Zimbabwe 86 
Armenia 87 Zambia 87 
Egypt 88 Turkey 88 
Papua New Guinea 89 Algeria 89 
India 90 Macedonia, Republic of 90 
Panama 91 Cyprus 91 
Madagascar 92 Malaysia 92 
Paraguay 93 Ghana 93 
Ghana 94 Tanzania, United Republic Of 94 
Colombia 95 Uganda 95 
Burkina Faso 96 Peru 96 
Zimbabwe 97 Philippines 97 
El Salvador 98 Brazil 98 
Philippines 99 Rwanda 99 
Nicaragua 100 Trinidad and Tobago 100 
Kenya 101 
 
 
Malawi 102 
 
 
Senegal 103 
 
 
Peru 104 
 
 
Tanzania 105 
 
 
Guyana 106 
 
 
Algeria 107 
 
 
Suriname 108 
 
 
Sierra Leone 109 
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Congo 110 
 
 
Guatemala 111 
 
 
Cameroon 112 
 
 
Yemen 113 
 
 
Indonesia 114 
 
 
Mozambique 115 
 
 
Guinea 116 
 
 
Honduras 117 
 
 
Zambia 118 
 
 
Togo 119 
 
 
Mali 120 
 
 
Uganda 121 
 
 
Ethiopia 122 
 
 
Niger 123 
 
 
Guinea-Bissau 124 
 
 
Pakistan 125 
 
 
Angola 126 
 
 
Myanmar 127 
 
 
Sri Lanka 128 
 
 
Sudan 129 
 
 
Bangladesh 130 
 
 
Nigeria 131 
 
 
Somalia 132 
 
 
Liberia 133 
 
 
Iraq 134 
 
 
Haiti 135 
 
 
Dem. Rep. Congo 136 
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Appendix 3.  Comparison of average Trust Index ranking and Trust Survey ranking 
Country Trust index ranking Trust survey ranking 
Finland 1 4 
Netherlands 2 7 
Luxembourg 3 40 
Denmark 4 3 
Sweden 5 2 
Norway 6 1 
Switzerland 7 10 
Australia 8 14 
Iceland 9 16 
New Zealand 10 8 
Austria 11 25 
Canada 12 12 
United States 13 19 
Japan 14 15 
Germany 15 23 
United Kingdom 16 21 
Ireland 17 17 
Belgium 18 27 
France 19 53 
Portugal 20 67 
Hong Kong SAR China 21 20 
Czech Republic 22 38 
Hungary 23 37 
Slovenia 24 63 
Italy 25 28 
Spain 26 26 
Slovak Republic 27 56 
Korea 28 32 
Cyprus 29 77 
Malta 30 55 
Croatia 31 54 
Estonia 32 47 
Latvia 33 57 
Greece 34 48 
Poland 35 50 
Lithuania 36 41 
Chile 37 59 
Bulgaria 38 36 
Saudi Arabia 39 6 
Malaysia 40 78 
China 41 5 
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Argentina 42 61 
Israel 43 49 
Thailand 44 18 
Azerbaijan 45 58 
Mexico 46 42 
Uruguay 47 44 
Belarus 48 31 
Brazil 49 84 
Moldova 50 64 
Romania 51 66 
Morocco 52 60 
Ukraine 53 29 
South Africa 54 62 
Jordan 55 30 
Trinidad and Tobago 56 85 
Albania 57 43 
Vietnam 58 9 
Dominican Republic 59 39 
Iran 60 24 
Russia 61 35 
Venezuela 62 69 
Turkey 63 75 
Armenia 64 45 
Egypt 65 33 
India 66 22 
Ghana 67 79 
Colombia 68 72 
Burkina Faso 69 70 
Zimbabwe 70 73 
El Salvador 71 71 
Philippines 72 83 
Peru 73 82 
Tanzania 74 80 
Algeria 75 76 
Guatemala 76 68 
Indonesia 77 11 
Zambia 78 74 
Mali 79 65 
Uganda 80 81 
Ethiopia 81 46 
Pakistan 82 34 
Bangladesh 83 51 
Nigeria 84 52 
Iraq 85 13 
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Appendix 4.  Sample statistic 
              Full sample (139) OECD Countries (31) Non-OECD Countries (108) 
Variable Obs         Mean Std. Obs  Mean Std. Obs      Mean Std. 
  Dev.   Dev.  Dev. 
trust index(a) 2,383 1.18E-09 0.9582 - - - - - - 
   
0.8822(be) 
0.3709(wi)       
trust index(b) 2,823 -6.50E-10 0.9569 877 0.9765 0.6015 1,946 -0.4401 0.736 
   
0.8873(be) 
0.3593(wi)   
0.5499(be) 
0.2496(wi)   
0.6477 
0.3990 
L1.trust 
index(b) 2,820 0.0006 0.9570 877 0.9765 0.6015 1,943 -0.4398 0.7362 
   
0.8879(be) 
0.3593(wi)   
0.5499(be) 
0.2496(wi)   
0.6482(be) 
0.3992(wi) 
L2.trust 
index(b) 2,787 0.0064 0.9591 877 0.9765 0.6015 1,910 -0.439 0.7386 
   
0.8875(be) 
0.3598(wi)   
0.5499(be) 
0.2496(wi)   
0.6491(be) 
0.4005(wi) 
L3.trust 
index(b) 2,692 0.0049 0.9625 844 0.9807 0.6035 1,848 -0.4408 0.7413 
   
0.8894(be) 
0.3636(wi)   
0.5511(be) 
0.2513(wi)   
0.6505(be) 
0.4048(wi) 
lfdi 3,436 0.4566 1.5986 869 0.525 1.3519 2,567 0.4334 1.6734 
lgini 938 3.6677 0.2664 252 3.4872 0.2204 686 3.734 0.2507 
income 3,133 9.0981 1.265 803 10.2643 0.4569 2,330 8.6962 1.2039 
education 2,978 72.9668 31.3267 927 99.0027 15.4272 2,051 61.1992 29.5389 
trade rate 3,778 79.1374 51.801 965 79.9813 46.8815 2,813 78.8479 53.3891 
inflation rate 3,893 53.5259 587.2015 965 8.2336 36.0034 2,928 68.4532 676.1347 
government 
cost 3,881 15.9548 6.2429 996 18.74 4.3814 2,885 14.9932 6.4967 
growth rate 3,900 3.5149 6.1937 965 2.7697 3.5027 2,935 3.7599 6.8341 
Notes: Trust index(a) is the one used in section 2.2.3 and section 2.3. It captures the trust level of each country 
by considering the dataset of time period from 1984 to 2008. Trust index(b) is the one used in section 2.4 
which is built by using the dataset with time period from 1984 to 2014. Income reported as logarithm of GDP 
per capita. Education reported as school enrolment, secondary (% gross); Trade rate reported as trade (% of 
GDP); Inflation rate reported as GDP deflator (annual %); Government cost reported as the general 
government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP); Growth rate reported as GDP growth (annual %). 
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Appendix 5.  Hausman test  
  ----   Coefficients ---- 
 (b)                       (B) 
  fe                         re 
 
 (b-B) 
Difference 
 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
        S.E. 
Trust index(t-1) 0.6650 0.3693  0.2957       0.0313 
 
Education 
 
0.0197 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0086 
       
      0.0014 
     
Trade rate 0.0227 0.0168 0.0059       0.0011 
     
Annual growth  
rate 
0.0445 0.0449 -0.0004       0.0008 
     
b= consistent under N0 and NO; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under NO, efficient under N0; obtained from xtreg 
Test: N0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  Chi2(4) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                                =  197.54 
             Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
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Appendix 6.   
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Appendix 7.  Hausman test  
  ----   Coefficients ---- 
 (b)                       (B) 
  fe                         re 
 
 (b-B) 
Difference 
 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
        S.E. 
Trust index(t-1) 0.0217 0.0042 0.0175       0.0049 
 
Education 
 
0.0003 
 
8.27e-06 
 
0.0002 
       
      0.0001 
     
Income 
 
-0.0476 -0.0572 0.0096       0.0135 
Trade rate 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001       0.0001 
 
Inflation rate 
 
-0.00003 
 
-0.00004 
 
-4.54e-07 
 
      0.00001 
 
Government 
consumption 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0013 
 
      0.0011 
     
b= consistent under N0 and NO; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under NO, efficient under N0; obtained from xtreg 
Test: N0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  Chi2(6) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                                =  18.81 
             Prob>chi2 =  0.0045 
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